Why is somalia important

This misses an important opportunity to define the wider operating framework, lines of political accountability and requirements to coordinate with national and international partners. In addition, a significant component of the Multi-Year Humanitarian Programme is dedicated to third party monitoring.

DFID and its contractors have developed sophisticated monitoring techniques, including satellite verification, call centres to collect beneficiary feedback and online data platforms. Although there is scope for further improvements, they provide DFID with assurance that its aid is reaching the intended beneficiaries, even in places where government staff are unable to visit.

We also identified several instances where DFID was able to intervene and resolve delivery problems identified by its independent monitors. We note that this approach to third party monitoring is considered to be an important innovation for UK aid operating in fragile and conflict-affected states, and this was spearheaded by DFID Somalia. The UK is also starting to use this apparatus to assess the results of its programming beyond the output level.

DFID has for example contracted an expert agency to collect qualitative data to assess the effects of a sensitive security and justice programme, the Basic Policing Programme, and to monitor the level of acceptance that new police forces are able to generate in the communities. Given the difficulty of obtaining reliable data in Somalia and the high risks of diversion, we understand why the third party monitoring focuses first on verifications, but we were disappointed not to see more of this across the governance portfolio, especially on programmes like the Somalia Stability Fund see below.

We also noted that in areas where access is easier, DFID generated some outcome data. According to a recent internal review, [50] DFID programme managers could make even more use of this investment in monitoring, for example to collect data at outcome level, on value for money and to support learning on effectiveness.

We recognise that generating more sophisticated outcome data through larger-scale surveys or in-depth qualitative interviews is still very challenging and expensive in Somalia and that DFID had justification to orient its third party monitoring apparatus towards verifications first given the high fiduciary risks for its operations.

Our interviews also suggested that DFID managers could make more use of the technical assistance made available to them under the programme to improve delivery standards down the supply chain. UK departments and external stakeholders noted significant improvement compared with the situation prior to the advent of the NSC country strategy in There are a lot fewer frictions between government departments than there used to be: the National Security Council and the CSSF structures played a role in improving this.

Coordination is the one thing that is the marked step change since the inception of the CSSF. The cross-Whitehall coordination is just so different. The architecture and ways of working much more genuinely correspond to the idea that all our work aggregates under the National Security Council Strategy. To explore the quality of coordination, we looked at three instances of how it had operated in response to specific issues or challenges see Box 9.

In the other cases we would have expected the coordinating committees to have played a more active or strategic role in addressing the issues. Figure 7 shows the typical journey times required to travel between the four different locations. Together, these factors constitute a lack of shared working space which is relevant to effectiveness and efficiency, as well as costs.

Cross-departmental collaboration has certainly improved following the advent of the NSC country strategy but we did not feel con dent that the four separate operating platforms and the different departmental arrangements were conducive to best value and optimal collaboration. We heard that a recent review had endorsed the current arrangements for managing aid to the Somaliland operations from Addis Ababa and Nairobi; however it did not consider all four locations.

There is a case for a more radical review, focusing on cost drivers and value for money as well as the consequences of the dislocations we referred to in Box This score sums up how well DFID projects, weighted by budget, deliver against their expectations; a score of would indicate that the programmes were, on average, delivering exactly as planned.

We found only two instances where this had occurred. We also saw two other cases where milestones were upgraded due to better-than-expected performance. While this is only output data, not impact, it is evidence of a portfolio that is delivering well in a very difficult environment. Interviews with stakeholders supported that conclusion see Box Across the 25 programmes we reviewed, we have evidence that at least 18 have achieved or are likely to achieve their outputs.

It is uncertain for four of them, and three programmes appear unlikely to achieve all their outputs. There is a mixed picture on achievement at outcome level. Because of this complexity, we found that outcome indicators in programme logframes did not always provide an accurate picture of emerging results.

Furthermore, many programmes are yet to generate outcome data. It is difficult to draw firm and clear conclusions about the contribution the programmes are making to conflict- and fragility-related outcomes based on this data. Nevertheless, our review of sampled programmes suggested that in 17 of the 25 programmes reviewed the links were plausible. This indicates that those outputs would contribute to the desired outcome. UK aid has helped to put in place some of the building blocks of a new Somali state Attributing results at a higher level to aid programmes is difficult.

However, we heard credible accounts that UK aid programmes, in particular the Somalia Stability Fund, the Basic Policing Programme and the Somaliland Development Fund — as well as the diplomatic access and influence that they facilitate — have made an important contribution to the search for a viable political settlement.

These accounts came from a range of very senior external stakeholders, from the donor and UN communities, expert partners and Somali officials.

Somali officials and other donors confirmed to us that the Somalia Stability Fund had played a central role in supporting political negotiations around this structure. The substantial budget and flexible nature of the Stability Fund makes it well suited to supporting local political processes.

UK support through the UN also contributes in this area. Through the Basic Policing Programme, the UK has also helped to establish an electronic payroll system for police forces in the sub-federal entities. This is an important element in bringing the security forces within an accountable civilian chain of command.

Establishing the electronic payment system is also seen as a significant development, as it is the only programme delivering stipend support electronically to individual staff accounts. In the February elections, Somalia elected a new president based on a larger electorate than in There was corruption, though this was identified and condemned, [57] but the elections were more inclusive than in the past.

The UK has also contributed to progress on improving public financial management in the Federal Government and some of the sub-national authorities through its funding of World Bank programmes.

In particular, security sector reform has not been achieved, and remains a significant area of concern for both donors and Somali officials. The UK has pushed for a more integrated international approach and has been instrumental in setting up a new donor group. As the programming uses mostly non-ODA funding, we did not review the activities in detail.

Also, informed commentators, such as the UN Monitoring Group, told us that the security sector including the forces under the Federal Government remained a serious threat to the stability of Somalia, potentially undermining the sustainability of results achieved through aid funding.

While it is too early to assess whether the state-building initiatives discussed above will be successful and the results sustained, the outputs indicate that important progress is being made.

Key stakeholders outside the UK government affirmed that the UK has made an exceptional contribution to some of the most important developments at the political level in Somalia in recent years. The situation in Somalia is complex and unpredictable, and characterised by a general absence of reliable data, which hampers results measurement, and all donors are struggling with this challenge.

To work in a strategic fashion, a set of relevant goals for the portfolio needs to be identified which is more explicit about which programmes are intended to contribute to which goal. At the same time, the goals should be realistic and achievable — and the goalposts as fixed as possible over time. We found a lack of clarity around how to formulate peace- and stability-related objectives and relevant and measurable indicators in many of the programmes we reviewed.

Only four programmes identified precisely which drivers of conflict they intended to address. There is also some inconsistency in the use of key concepts across programmes and departments. This need for greater clarity about strategic purpose may also be hampering oversight of delivery partners. The results measurement challenge is most acute for the CSSF, which exists to address conflict and fragility but has generated little information about its results at outcome level thus far see Table 4.

We also found very little information about the impact of earlier Conflict Pool projects, and managers acknowledged that the Conflict Pool struggled with significant documentation and results monitoring problems.

The CSSF was intended to produce more robust reporting against NSC country objectives and it has developed results frameworks linking projects with high-level objectives. However, while some individual projects had begun to report results, the CSSF reporting that was available for this review had not succeeded in articulating and measuring how these results contributed to peace and stability.

In its first year of operation , the CSSF was limited to one-year projects, for which procurement was extensively delayed. With only six months of the year left to deliver, projects were limited in their ability to generate significant results. The CSSF has now moved to three-year programmes, allowing for a more strategic use of funds, an important step forward in addressing these issues. One project in Somaliland was made up of multiple components that were not tied together with a strong strategy or theory of change.

Some were quickly discontinued. This is not necessarily inconsistent with an adaptive approach, though it would be desirable to collect more information on the history of these investments. In the Mogadishu security package, over- ambitious targets were downgraded when the project found it lacked political influence. In the high- risk Reconciliation programme, the UK managers lacked sufficient oversight of activities and ability to remedy issues on the ground.

However, we also found that some CSSF managers responded quickly by terminating or downscaling unsuccessful projects, so that the funds could be reallocated. Some CSSF managers expressed the view that a key justification for the portfolio was as a platform for diplomatic access and influence, enabling the UK to lead the international community in strategic initiatives and helping it to deliver on the high-level results mentioned above.

We acknowledge that an important part of the value of the CSSF is at the level of influence, and that there may be legitimate and practical reasons why this influence is not always documented. However, we find that the influencing value needs to be supported by stronger results measurement at project and portfolio levels see Box We saw this happening, for example, in the human rights programme.

However, as discussed below, the CSSF does not yet have a strong enough approach to learning for piloting purposes. We reviewed our sample of 25 DFID, Conflict Pool and CSSF programmes and projects against five proxy indicators for sound project management to see how focused the management systems are on delivering impact and value for money see the table below.

Most of the 11 DFID programmes had robust results frameworks and were tracking cost and value drivers, although they were not always able to monitor unit costs.

However, we found that most DFID programmes had not fully implemented annual review recommendations. The CSSF projects were notably weaker in their results frameworks and in their monitoring of impact and value for money.

Managers in both London and Somalia were aware of these shortcomings. Part of the problem may be that some core programme management functions are not sufficiently integrated with policy oversight and are focused on compliance rather than active management. While CSSF programmes are intended to be smaller and more flexible, which entails lighter management, there is scope for the CSSF to improve its focus on results and value for money without compromising its operating model.

Evidence from the UN Security Council Monitoring Group shows that pay for troops and police is frequently late and reduced, leading to troop withdrawals from strategic positions in southern and central Somalia and the retaking of territory by Al-Shabaab. The extraversion of foreign aid and external stabilization has been so long- standing and entrenched that donors and the range of external actors aiming to influence political developments in Somalia have become an integral part of these processes.

The strategy, which is shared with partners, sets out the procedures to follow at each stage of the programme cycle, including undertaking due diligence before making funding decisions DFID does not fund the Somali government directly.

In addition to extensive third party monitoring, use is also made of innovative digital technology, beneficiary feedback and further verifications to check investments. Our case study of UK stipend payments showed that DFID had put in place biometric and cashless systems for paying police officers, to minimise the risks of abuse and diversion. These systems may increase the level of certainty that payment reaches the intended recipient.

However, they cannot eliminate all risks — for example, that money is extracted from the recipient later or that the beneficiary does not actually perform the services for which they are paid. Such risks would have to be monitored in other ways — for example, through unannounced inspection visits.

These fiduciary risk controls are progressively being taken up in CSSF projects. In addition, it is challenging to characterise performance across the DFID and CSSF portfolios when the CSSF is clearly at a much earlier stage in developing its programme management systems and has some progress to make, although with evidence of improvement.

Overall, our green-amber assessment takes account of the extremely difficult operating environment in Somalia, where there is still hardly any access for international development actors in the south and, until recently, very few existing channels of data collection. It is clear that the UK has come a considerable distance in recent years in developing the capacity to operate in this environment.

Its investments in new delivery channels and third party monitoring have given it the ability to deliver aid directly and support the NSC country strategy. The UK has taken a leading role among the international actors working in Somalia. There has been important early progress in putting in place elements of a new political settlement and, while it is difficult to establish attribution, there is evidence that UK aid and the access and influence that it has enabled have made an important contribution to this progress.

Most UK programmes are performing well against their immediate objectives, and are delivering a range of humanitarian and development benefits to the population. However, our review looked at the narrower question of whether aid is making an effective contribution to overcoming conflict and fragility.

Here we found that programmes are struggling to articulate exactly how they contribute to peace and stability, and that the portfolio is relatively weak in results measurement in this area. These are largely technical challenges. Over time, we would expect to see a clearer vision emerge as to how the different aspects of the aid portfolio work together to address drivers of conflict and promote stability.

This final section sets out our findings as to how well the UK is learning about using aid to address conflict and fragility in Somalia. This has led on promoting improvements across the two o ces in programme management through training, guidance and internal peer review of annual reviews. It also developed a value for money action plan.

The team has achieved traction in important areas such as:. We found that guidance produced by the team on annual reviews and completion reports was in use, and the staff we consulted recalled their training on adaptive programming, delivered some six months prior to our visit. Some of its initiatives could be better sustained, for example a initiative to improve compliance with best practice on logframes. The Accountability and Results Team lacked a manager for six months in , which led to a temporary de-prioritisation of some initiatives.

DFID Somalia has a number of mechanisms to collect lessons learned at programme level. In particular, the Accountability and Results Team compiles and disseminates lessons noted in annual reviews. There are cross-government away days that bring the whole team together with external experts for strategy sessions. DFID Somalia has quarterly portfolio-level risk meetings and also holds value for money, risk and results meetings during office-wide in-week sessions.

These also look at higher-level strategy issues linked to delivering the business plan. We were able to identify only three independent evaluations and eight internal reviews across the programmes that we reviewed. Final evaluations generally came too late in the programme cycle to inform the design of the next iteration of the programme. We acknowledge that conducting proper evaluations in the Somali context is difficult and expensive but, given that DFID Somalia told us that they regarded a significant part of their programming since as experimental, we would like to have seen more.

Add to that a faltering economy, high unemployment, poor health and educational outcomes and wizened infrastructure and it is plain to see why Somalia has become such fertile ground for terrorism. And terror struck again on Saturday, when nine people were killed and at least 13 injured in a car bomb attack at the gates of the Interior Ministry in Mogadishu. Al Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attack — kindling memories of a truck bombing last October that left more than people dead.

Some progress has been made in recent years. With the assistance of the UAE and others, Somalia has all but stamped out piracy, with which it was once synonymous.

Meanwhile many were hopeful when Mohamed Abdullahi Mohamed — US-educated and bureaucratic — was sworn in as president early last year. BBC Monitoring's Beverly Ochieng explains why the elections hold such importance for the rest of the continent. Graphic design by Olaniyi Adebimpe and Ifiokabasi Ettang. Produced and edited by Miriam O'Donkor. All five federal member states FMS now publish quarterly all-of-government revenue realization and budget execution.

The Bank-supported Financial Governance Committee has overall oversight of financial governance and has to date reviewed 42 concessions contracts resulting in the amendment of The inter-governmental fiscal framework and harmonization of taxes will require sustained engagement but the Recurrent Cost and Reform Financing Project RCRF is convening Ministers of Finance, reaching agreements and harmonizing the approach to fiscal transfers, through Development Policy Financing.

The Public Expenditure Review due in FY21 includes domestic revenue mobilization, fiscal federalism, wage bill and public financial management assessment. Improving systems for inclusive social services in social protection, health, and education are ongoing through the Baxnaano safety net program. This includes the development of a national social registry benefiting , households. Through RCRF, the FGS has undertaken proficiency testing of nearly 3, primary and secondary teachers and is preparing to provide case management and safe spaces for victims of gender-based violence.

Creating business opportunities: With World Bank and International Finance Corporation IFC support, Somalia has made gains on improving the business environment and lowering barriers to entry.

With assistance from the SCORE project , Somalia has adopted laws and regulations to strengthen the business climate; launched a business registration system in Mogadishu; improved payment systems and approved new mobile money regulations.

It also commenced implementation of the Communication Act with the adoption of regulations on interconnection, altogether with the establishment of the Communications Authority. The outcome of the study will provide input to the design of targeted solutions to enhance financial inclusion including digital finance].

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